Commit f34edc87 authored by Lorenzo "Palinuro" Faletra's avatar Lorenzo "Palinuro" Faletra
Browse files

Import Upstream version 4.16.12

parent 71f9d50b
......@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities
......
......@@ -2647,6 +2647,9 @@
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
to spectre_v2=off.
nospec_store_bypass_disable
[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
......@@ -3997,6 +4000,48 @@
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
spec_store_bypass_disable=
[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a
a common industry wide performance optimization known
as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which recent stores
to the same memory location may not be observed by
later loads during speculative execution. The idea
is that such stores are unlikely and that they can
be detected prior to instruction retirement at the
end of a particular speculation execution window.
In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
store can be used in a cache side channel attack, for
example to read memory to which the attacker does not
directly have access (e.g. inside sandboxed code).
This parameter controls whether the Speculative Store
Bypass optimization is used.
on - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass
off - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
auto - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
picks the most appropriate mitigation. If the
CPU is not vulnerable, "off" is selected. If the
CPU is vulnerable the default mitigation is
architecture and Kconfig dependent. See below.
prctl - Control Speculative Store Bypass per thread
via prctl. Speculative Store Bypass is enabled
for a process by default. The state of the control
is inherited on fork.
seccomp - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp threads
will disable SSB unless they explicitly opt out.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spec_store_bypass_disable=auto.
Default mitigations:
X86: If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
spia_io_base= [HW,MTD]
spia_fio_base=
spia_pedr=
......
......@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ stable kernels.
| ARM | Cortex-A57 | #834220 | ARM64_ERRATUM_834220 |
| ARM | Cortex-A72 | #853709 | N/A |
| ARM | Cortex-A73 | #858921 | ARM64_ERRATUM_858921 |
| ARM | Cortex-A55 | #1024718 | ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718 |
| ARM | MMU-500 | #841119,#826419 | N/A |
| | | | |
| Cavium | ThunderX ITS | #22375, #24313 | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375 |
......
......@@ -21,9 +21,10 @@ Required properties:
- main controller clock (for both armada-375-pp2 and armada-7k-pp2)
- GOP clock (for both armada-375-pp2 and armada-7k-pp2)
- MG clock (only for armada-7k-pp2)
- MG Core clock (only for armada-7k-pp2)
- AXI clock (only for armada-7k-pp2)
- clock-names: names of used clocks, must be "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk"
and "axi_clk" (the 2 latter only for armada-7k-pp2).
- clock-names: names of used clocks, must be "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk",
"mg_core_clk" and "axi_clk" (the 3 latter only for armada-7k-pp2).
The ethernet ports are represented by subnodes. At least one port is
required.
......@@ -80,8 +81,8 @@ cpm_ethernet: ethernet@0 {
compatible = "marvell,armada-7k-pp22";
reg = <0x0 0x100000>, <0x129000 0xb000>;
clocks = <&cpm_syscon0 1 3>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 9>,
<&cpm_syscon0 1 5>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 18>;
clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "gp_clk", "axi_clk";
<&cpm_syscon0 1 5>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 6>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 18>;
clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk", "mg_core_clk", "axi_clk";
eth0: eth0 {
interrupts = <ICU_GRP_NSR 39 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
......
......@@ -1386,26 +1386,26 @@ mld_qrv - INTEGER
Default: 2 (as specified by RFC3810 9.1)
Minimum: 1 (as specified by RFC6636 4.5)
max_dst_opts_cnt - INTEGER
max_dst_opts_number - INTEGER
Maximum number of non-padding TLVs allowed in a Destination
options extension header. If this value is less than zero
then unknown options are disallowed and the number of known
TLVs allowed is the absolute value of this number.
Default: 8
max_hbh_opts_cnt - INTEGER
max_hbh_opts_number - INTEGER
Maximum number of non-padding TLVs allowed in a Hop-by-Hop
options extension header. If this value is less than zero
then unknown options are disallowed and the number of known
TLVs allowed is the absolute value of this number.
Default: 8
max dst_opts_len - INTEGER
max_dst_opts_length - INTEGER
Maximum length allowed for a Destination options extension
header.
Default: INT_MAX (unlimited)
max hbh_opts_len - INTEGER
max_hbh_length - INTEGER
Maximum length allowed for a Hop-by-Hop options extension
header.
Default: INT_MAX (unlimited)
......
......@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ place where this information is gathered.
no_new_privs
seccomp_filter
unshare
spec_ctrl
.. only:: subproject and html
......
===================
Speculation Control
===================
Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in
fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across
privilege domains.
The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some
can be supplied on the kernel command line.
There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
There are two prctl options which are related to this:
* PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
* PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-----------------------
PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
the following meaning:
==== ===================== ===================================================
Bit Define Description
==== ===================== ===================================================
0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
disabled.
2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
enabled.
3 PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
==== ===================== ===================================================
If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
misfeature will fail.
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
-----------------------
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
Common error codes
------------------
======= =================================================================
Value Meaning
======= =================================================================
EINVAL The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
prctl(2) arguments are not 0.
ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.
======= =================================================================
PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
-----------------------------------
======= =================================================================
Value Meaning
======= =================================================================
0 Success
ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
ENXIO Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
EPERM Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller
tried to enable it again.
======= =================================================================
Speculation misfeature controls
-------------------------------
- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
Invocations:
* prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
* prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
......@@ -1960,6 +1960,9 @@ ARM 32-bit VFP control registers have the following id bit patterns:
ARM 64-bit FP registers have the following id bit patterns:
0x4030 0000 0012 0 <regno:12>
ARM firmware pseudo-registers have the following bit pattern:
0x4030 0000 0014 <regno:16>
arm64 registers are mapped using the lower 32 bits. The upper 16 of
that is the register group type, or coprocessor number:
......@@ -1976,6 +1979,9 @@ arm64 CCSIDR registers are demultiplexed by CSSELR value:
arm64 system registers have the following id bit patterns:
0x6030 0000 0013 <op0:2> <op1:3> <crn:4> <crm:4> <op2:3>
arm64 firmware pseudo-registers have the following bit pattern:
0x6030 0000 0014 <regno:16>
MIPS registers are mapped using the lower 32 bits. The upper 16 of that is
the register group type:
......@@ -2510,7 +2516,8 @@ Possible features:
and execute guest code when KVM_RUN is called.
- KVM_ARM_VCPU_EL1_32BIT: Starts the CPU in a 32bit mode.
Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_EL1_32BIT (arm64 only).
- KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2: Emulate PSCI v0.2 for the CPU.
- KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2: Emulate PSCI v0.2 (or a future revision
backward compatible with v0.2) for the CPU.
Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PSCI_0_2.
- KVM_ARM_VCPU_PMU_V3: Emulate PMUv3 for the CPU.
Depends on KVM_CAP_ARM_PMU_V3.
......
KVM implements the PSCI (Power State Coordination Interface)
specification in order to provide services such as CPU on/off, reset
and power-off to the guest.
The PSCI specification is regularly updated to provide new features,
and KVM implements these updates if they make sense from a virtualization
point of view.
This means that a guest booted on two different versions of KVM can
observe two different "firmware" revisions. This could cause issues if
a given guest is tied to a particular PSCI revision (unlikely), or if
a migration causes a different PSCI version to be exposed out of the
blue to an unsuspecting guest.
In order to remedy this situation, KVM exposes a set of "firmware
pseudo-registers" that can be manipulated using the GET/SET_ONE_REG
interface. These registers can be saved/restored by userspace, and set
to a convenient value if required.
The following register is defined:
* KVM_REG_ARM_PSCI_VERSION:
- Only valid if the vcpu has the KVM_ARM_VCPU_PSCI_0_2 feature set
(and thus has already been initialized)
- Returns the current PSCI version on GET_ONE_REG (defaulting to the
highest PSCI version implemented by KVM and compatible with v0.2)
- Allows any PSCI version implemented by KVM and compatible with
v0.2 to be set with SET_ONE_REG
- Affects the whole VM (even if the register view is per-vcpu)
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 4
PATCHLEVEL = 16
SUBLEVEL = 5
SUBLEVEL = 12
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Fearless Coyote
......
......@@ -134,37 +134,37 @@ mux {
function = "gmii";
groups = "gmii_gmac0_grp";
};
/* Settings come from OpenWRT */
/* Settings come from OpenWRT, pins on SL3516 */
conf0 {
pins = "R8 GMAC0 RXDV", "U11 GMAC1 RXDV";
pins = "V8 GMAC0 RXDV", "T10 GMAC1 RXDV";
skew-delay = <0>;
};
conf1 {
pins = "T8 GMAC0 RXC", "T11 GMAC1 RXC";
pins = "Y7 GMAC0 RXC", "Y11 GMAC1 RXC";
skew-delay = <15>;
};
conf2 {
pins = "P8 GMAC0 TXEN", "V11 GMAC1 TXEN";
pins = "T8 GMAC0 TXEN", "W11 GMAC1 TXEN";
skew-delay = <7>;
};
conf3 {
pins = "V7 GMAC0 TXC";
pins = "U8 GMAC0 TXC";
skew-delay = <11>;
};
conf4 {
pins = "P10 GMAC1 TXC";
pins = "V11 GMAC1 TXC";
skew-delay = <10>;
};
conf5 {
/* The data lines all have default skew */
pins = "U8 GMAC0 RXD0", "V8 GMAC0 RXD1",
"P9 GMAC0 RXD2", "R9 GMAC0 RXD3",
"U7 GMAC0 TXD0", "T7 GMAC0 TXD1",
"R7 GMAC0 TXD2", "P7 GMAC0 TXD3",
"R11 GMAC1 RXD0", "P11 GMAC1 RXD1",
"V12 GMAC1 RXD2", "U12 GMAC1 RXD3",
"R10 GMAC1 TXD0", "T10 GMAC1 TXD1",
"U10 GMAC1 TXD2", "V10 GMAC1 TXD3";
pins = "W8 GMAC0 RXD0", "V9 GMAC0 RXD1",
"Y8 GMAC0 RXD2", "U9 GMAC0 RXD3",
"T7 GMAC0 TXD0", "U6 GMAC0 TXD1",
"V7 GMAC0 TXD2", "U7 GMAC0 TXD3",
"Y12 GMAC1 RXD0", "V12 GMAC1 RXD1",
"T11 GMAC1 RXD2", "W12 GMAC1 RXD3",
"U10 GMAC1 TXD0", "Y10 GMAC1 TXD1",
"W10 GMAC1 TXD2", "T9 GMAC1 TXD3";
skew-delay = <7>;
};
/* Set up drive strength on GMAC0 to 16 mA */
......
......@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ wdog: wdog@53fdc000 {
};
can1: can@53fe4000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx35-flexcan";
compatible = "fsl,imx35-flexcan", "fsl,imx25-flexcan";
reg = <0x53fe4000 0x1000>;
clocks = <&clks 33>, <&clks 33>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
......@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ can1: can@53fe4000 {
};
can2: can@53fe8000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx35-flexcan";
compatible = "fsl,imx35-flexcan", "fsl,imx25-flexcan";
reg = <0x53fe8000 0x1000>;
clocks = <&clks 34>, <&clks 34>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
......
......@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ uart2: serial@53fc0000 {
};
can1: can@53fc8000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx53-flexcan";
compatible = "fsl,imx53-flexcan", "fsl,imx25-flexcan";
reg = <0x53fc8000 0x4000>;
interrupts = <82>;
clocks = <&clks IMX5_CLK_CAN1_IPG_GATE>,
......@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ can1: can@53fc8000 {
};
can2: can@53fcc000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx53-flexcan";
compatible = "fsl,imx53-flexcan", "fsl,imx25-flexcan";
reg = <0x53fcc000 0x4000>;
interrupts = <83>;
clocks = <&clks IMX5_CLK_CAN2_IPG_GATE>,
......
......@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ CONFIG_MTD_M25P80=y
CONFIG_MTD_NAND=y
CONFIG_MTD_NAND_DENALI_DT=y
CONFIG_MTD_SPI_NOR=y
# CONFIG_MTD_SPI_NOR_USE_4K_SECTORS is not set
CONFIG_SPI_CADENCE_QUADSPI=y
CONFIG_OF_OVERLAY=y
CONFIG_OF_CONFIGFS=y
......
......@@ -536,4 +536,14 @@ THUMB( orr \reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT )
#endif
.endm
#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES
#define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry) \
.pushsection "_kprobe_blacklist", "aw" ; \
.balign 4 ; \
.long entry; \
.popsection
#else
#define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry)
#endif
#endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H__ */
......@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ struct kvm_arch {
/* Interrupt controller */
struct vgic_dist vgic;
int max_vcpus;
/* Mandated version of PSCI */
u32 psci_version;
};
#define KVM_NR_MEM_OBJS 40
......
......@@ -295,6 +295,22 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_get_vmid_bits(void)
return 8;
}
/*
* We are not in the kvm->srcu critical section most of the time, so we take
* the SRCU read lock here. Since we copy the data from the user page, we
* can immediately drop the lock again.
*/
static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned long len)
{
int srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
int ret = kvm_read_guest(kvm, gpa, data, len);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, srcu_idx);
return ret;
}
static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
{
return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
......
......@@ -186,6 +186,12 @@ struct kvm_arch_memory_slot {
#define KVM_REG_ARM_VFP_FPINST 0x1009
#define KVM_REG_ARM_VFP_FPINST2 0x100A
/* KVM-as-firmware specific pseudo-registers */
#define KVM_REG_ARM_FW (0x0014 << KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_SHIFT)
#define KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(r) (KVM_REG_ARM | KVM_REG_SIZE_U64 | \
KVM_REG_ARM_FW | ((r) & 0xffff))
#define KVM_REG_ARM_PSCI_VERSION KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(0)
/* Device Control API: ARM VGIC */
#define KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_ADDR 0
#define KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_DIST_REGS 1
......
......@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/hardirq.h>
#include <linux/kdebug.h>
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
......@@ -417,7 +418,8 @@ void unregister_undef_hook(struct undef_hook *hook)
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&undef_lock, flags);
}
static int call_undef_hook(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
static nokprobe_inline
int call_undef_hook(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
{
struct undef_hook *hook;
unsigned long flags;
......@@ -490,6 +492,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs)
arm_notify_die("Oops - undefined instruction", regs, &info, 0, 6);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_undefinstr)
/*
* Handle FIQ similarly to NMI on x86 systems.
......
......@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <kvm/arm_psci.h>
#include <asm/cputype.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/kvm.h>
......@@ -176,6 +177,7 @@ static unsigned long num_core_regs(void)
unsigned long kvm_arm_num_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return num_core_regs() + kvm_arm_num_coproc_regs(vcpu)
+ kvm_arm_get_fw_num_regs(vcpu)
+ NUM_TIMER_REGS;
}
......@@ -196,6 +198,11 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
uindices++;
}
ret = kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(vcpu, uindices);
if (ret)
return ret;
uindices += kvm_arm_get_fw_num_regs(vcpu);
ret = copy_timer_indices(vcpu, uindices);
if (ret)
return ret;
......@@ -214,6 +221,9 @@ int kvm_arm_get_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
if ((reg->id & KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_MASK) == KVM_REG_ARM_CORE)
return get_core_reg(vcpu, reg);
if ((reg->id & KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_MASK) == KVM_REG_ARM_FW)
return kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(vcpu, reg);
if (is_timer_reg(reg->id))
return get_timer_reg(vcpu, reg);
......@@ -230,6 +240,9 @@ int kvm_arm_set_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
if ((reg->id & KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_MASK) == KVM_REG_ARM_CORE)
return set_core_reg(vcpu, reg);
if ((reg->id & KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_MASK) == KVM_REG_ARM_FW)
return kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(vcpu, reg);
if (is_timer_reg(reg->id))
return set_timer_reg(vcpu, reg);
......
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